Oleg Sarin, Lev Dvoretsky, "Alien Wars : the Soviet Union's Aggressions against the World, 1919 to 1989", 1996
Книга интересна в основном из-за авторов. Сарин -- бывший первый зам. редактора газеты Cоветской Армии "Красная звезда". Дворецкий -- офицер СА в 1948-1982 гг.
* * *
The specific aggressions covered range from Soviet participation in the Spanish Civil War to the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. Drawing on previously classified material and numerous other sources, the authors reveal some of the Soviet initiatives-and the sometimes shocking means to carry them out-associated with the state goals of spreading communism throughout the world and expanding the Soviet Union's own territory. The Soviet military interventions in Cuba, Vietnam, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Afghanistan all are described in penetrating detail, as are the political and "ideological" influences leading to these opportunistic forays into the affairs of other nations. The authors assess, with considerable insight, the evolution of Soviet expansionist strategy and the internal repressions carried out by Lenin and Stalin (and, according to the authors, most of their successors as well). "Powerful ideological pressures fooled millions of people," the authors assert, "and lies in the form of constant propaganda, coupled with the distinct possibility of death or imprisonment for the slightest offense, caused our people to toe the line and support what they thought was an honorable regime.... Mikhail Gorbachev tried to revitalize socialism in the country, but failed. The whole rotten system fell in shambles, with many new sovereign states resulting. It is our fervent hope," they conclude, "that current world leaders will find a way to prevent any further arms race and reduce the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to the level where world peace can be assured." A thought-provoking and chilling assessment of the Soviet regime from the perspective of two insiders who lived within the system.
* * *
Stalin in particular, they show, pursued the goal of world revolution in Spain and Finland, in Eastern Europe and Korea. After his death, the policy of "neoglobalism" continued. Sarin and Dvoretsky chronicle the significant direct role of U.S.S.R. technicians in Vietnam, the stationing of missile units and ground forces in Cuba and an involvement in Africa so extensive and complex that, on one occasion, Soviet advisers found themselves on both sides of a war between Ethiopia and Somalia.
The authors' major contribution is their archivally based demonstration that Soviet policies were primarily motivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology rather than by geopolitical concerns.
Read in company with R.C. Roach's pathbreaking Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945, this book leaves no doubt of the U.S.S.R.'s ultimate goal. Sarin and Dvoretsky, however, tend to overstate the actual levels of Soviet commitment to expansionist campaigns. On the whole, Stalin and his successors played for only minor human and material stakes, preferring to let proxies bear the brunt of the risks and losses. This caution stands in sharp contrast to U.S. policies in, for example, Korea and Vietnam and may help explain why, in its final crisis, the U.S.S.R. stood alone.