January 10th, 2011

kluven

(no subject)

"The Soviet Bloc Hard Currency Problem and the Impact of Western Credit Restrictions"
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000272981/DOC_0000272981.pdf

"The Soviet Financial Problem as a Source of Western Influence"
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000273390/DOC_0000273390.pdf

CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Economy
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article02.html

Стоимость поддержки Кубы для СССР, в прямых затратах твёрдой валюты: 1-1.5 млрд. USD ежегодно с 1960 по 1979.
Irving Louis Horowitz, "Cuban Communism", стр. 230-232.
kluven

(no subject)

How the United States used competition to win the Cold War

U.S. & ESTIMATED USSR GDP & MILITARY EXPENDITURES
(IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

           U.S. *                   USSR

        GDP    MIL.       GDP       MIL.     %INC     %GDP

1980   2,732    134   455 **         150              33%
1985   4,137    253   553            217   45% ***    39%
1990   5,736    299   673            315   45% ****   47%
1999   9,130    275   314 Russia
                        *****
                      482 Russia
                        plus 14
                        former
                        Republics
                        *****

* U.S. GDP and National Defense from Federal Budget Historical Tables 10.1 and 3.1.

** Casey's estimate of 1/6 of U.S. GDP. Then assumes a 4 percent increase/year in Soviet GNP.

*** 45 percent planned for 1981 to 1985 was the minimum spent (Schweizer, 1994, p. 197).

**** Gorbachev raised it another 45 percent in the next five years
(Ibid. p. 240--Gorbachev speech to Nizhniy Tagil Workers, April 27, 1990).

***** Estimate of 1999 GDPs reported in 2001 Index of Freedom
(O'Driscoll, Jr. 2000, Russia on p. 315 and the others are all given in this annual publication).

THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE
In Billions of U.S. Dollars

                             1980   1985       1986-89         1990s

Aid to client States

1. Cuba                                         4 to 5         these
2. Nicaragua                                     0.7          stopped
3. Ethiopia and Mozambique                        3
4. Vietnam                                      4 to 5

Total                        10 *   15 **   11.7 - 13.7 ***

* (Brown, 1988, p. 138 op. cit. Brooks, p. 23

** The Rand Corporation estimated that support of client states and
KGB operations were 3 percent of the Soviet GNP in the mid 1980's
(Rowen, 1990, p. 9).

*** (Crozier, 1999, p.507)

ADDED COSTS & SHORTFALLS IN PLANNED FUNDING
IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS

                               1982      1985       1986-89      1990's

Added Costs
1. Increase in Oil Field
   Maintenance                  3       3          3
2. Aid to Poland                1       2          3 till left
3. War in Afghanistan           2       3          4 till left
4. Cost to Replace Western
   Technology                   2       5          5 +
Subtotal                        8/yr   13/yr      15 +/year

Shortfall in Export Sales, Foreign Investment, Credits, and Loans

1. Japan-Soviet Oil & Gas
   Venture Stopped                                 4                4
2. Siberian Pipeline Delayed    1       8          2
3. Loss of Second Pipeline                                         15
4. Soviets had to make loans
   to Warsaw Pact that West
   no longer made               8       8
5. Price of Oil [down arrow]
   from $30+ to $12/barrel                        13+
6. Lost Arm Sales                                  2
7. Foreign Investment
   Stopped                              1          5 +
8. Foreign Credits Stopped              2          8
9. Drop in Gas Revenue                             2
10.Devaluation of U.S.
   Dollar (Soviet Sales in
   Dollars)                             2
Subtotal                        9/yr   21Sch/yr   36 +/year        19
Added Costs and Shortfalls     17/yr   34/yr      51 +             19

(Schweizer 1994, p. 72, 120, 194-5, 214-6, 256, 262-5, 273-4, 284)
(Cold War Seminar, 1999)