May 25th, 2019


По поводу "спасшего мир майора Петрова"

(Помимо обычного хайпа, только вчера нарвался в телевизоре на фильм под заглавием "Человек, который спас мир" ).

Что имеет по этому поводу сказать П. Подвиг, с опорой на записки Г.К. Хромова:

"the Soviet Union has never relied on launch on warning and would wait for actual nuclear explosions on its territory before making the decision to retaliate"

"Moreover, even the launch from under attack/otvetno-vstrechnyy udar was a relatively recent addition to the Soviet arsenal of options - it was a result of a focused effort undertaken in the early 1980s..."

"the conscious decision to adopt retaliation after ride-out/otvetnyy udar as the core strategic posture was also relatively recent - it was born during what is known as a "small civil war" in the late 1960s-early 1970s".

"It's fairly difficult to say if there was any specific strategy before that, though. My understanding is that it was largely left to circumstances and it is quite possible that some scenarios during the 1960s made room for a pre-emptive attack. But once the Soviet Union started to systematically consider its options, first strike was quickly eliminated - the Soviet Union never had a realistic first strike capability and unlike the United States was not enamored by the concept of damage limitation".

"But why would the Soviet Union invest so much effort into deploying early-warning radars and satellites if it never planned to rely on that early warning? Launch on warning seems like a reasonable thing to do. The full story is rather complicated, but one thing is certain - the role of the Soviet early-warning system was quite different from that of its U.S. counterpart. Most importantly, the Soviet Union did not really have the luxury of relying on "dual phenomenology" - the ability to see an incoming attack by two types of sensors (see this post and this article that look into this in some detail) Accordingly, it had to build its command and control system in a way that would not assume that the leadership has enough time to make a decision before first attacking warheads reach their targets."

"The way the command and control system was designed is fully compatible with the idea of not having the launch-on-warning option. Once the early-warning system detects an attack, the leadership does not have to rush to make a decision. Instead, it has the option of issuing what is called a "preliminary command" that would bring the nuclear forces into a higher level of readiness [...] This command would also authorize the military to launch missiles in retaliation if that a number of conditions are met. One of these conditions is probably a loss of communication with the central command authority. For the purposes of this discussion it is important that other conditions include confirmed nuclear detonations on the territory of Russia. And it appears that the detection of nuclear explosions is, in fact, a necessary condition for a retaliatory launch [...]"

"The order to implement the OVU can be issued only after first nuclear explosions on the territory of the country that was attacked. This mechanism provides some insurance against a decapitation strike and also against an accidental launch that would be based on incomplete information. It also takes off quite a bit of pressure of the decision-making chain, since no irreversible decisions have to be made until there is a reliable confirmation that an attack is under way."

"In fact, the system could probably handle an accidental launch of a limited number of missiles without launching an attack in response."

"This means, by the way, that neither the Colonel Petrov incident in 1983 nor the Norwegian Black Brant launch in 1995 was as dangerous as it is usually believed. Nobody would have launched anything based on just an alert generated by the early-warning system. "

"The interesting question is, what is the situation today? Does Russia have a launch-on-warning option?"

(далее см. по ссылке)